Minority Shareholder Protections and the Private Benefits of Control for Swedish Mergers
HolmÃ©n, Martin and
John D. Knopf
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Martin Holmen
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2004, vol. 39, issue 1, 167-191
Sweden has a high degree of separation of ownership from control through pyramids, dual-class shares, and cross-holdings. This increases the potential for private benefits of control. However, Sweden's extralegal institutionsâ€”tax compliance and newspaper circulationâ€”are consistent with greater shareholder protection. Using data on Swedish mergers we find limited evidence of shareholder expropriation. Apparently, Sweden's extralegal institutions offset the drawback of weak corporate governance.
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