Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China

Henk Berkman, Rebel Cole and Lawrence J. Fu

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2010, vol. 45, issue 6, 1391-1417

Abstract: We examine the wealth effects of 3 regulatory changes designed to improve minority-shareholder protection in the Chinese stock markets. Using the value of a firm’s related-party transactions as an inverse proxy for the quality of corporate governance, wefind that firms with weaker governance experienced significantly larger abnormal returns around announcements of the new regulations than did firms with stronger governance. We also find that firms with strong ties to the government did not benefit from the regulations, suggesting that minority shareholders did not expect regulators to enforce the new rules on firms where blockholders have strong political connections.

Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Political connections and minority-shareholder protection: Evidence from securities-market regulation in China (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:45:y:2011:i:06:p:1391-1417_00

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