Network Centrality and Managerial Market-Timing Ability

Theodoros Evgeniou, Joel Peress, Theo Vermaelen and Ling Yue

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2022, vol. 57, issue 2, 704-760

Abstract: We document that long-run excess returns following announcements of share buyback authorizations and insider purchases are a U-shaped function of firm centrality in the input–output trade-flow network. These results conform to a model of investors endowed with a large but finite capacity for analyzing firms. Additional links weaken insiders’ informational advantage in peripheral firms (simple firms whose cash flows depend on few economic links), provided investors’ capacity is large enough, but eventually amplify that advantage in central firms (firms with many links) as a result of investors’ limited capacity. These findings shed light on the sources of managerial market-timing ability.

Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Network Centrality and Managerial Market Timing Ability (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:57:y:2022:i:2:p:704-760_10

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().