Reintermediation in FinTech: Evidence from Online Lending

Tetyana Balyuk and Sergei Davydenko

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2024, vol. 59, issue 5, 1997-2037

Abstract: We document the unique structure of the peer-to-peer lending market. Originally designed as decentralized, the market has become highly, but not fully, reintermediated. The platforms’ software now performs essentially all tasks related to loan evaluation, whereas most lenders are passive and automatically fund most applications on offer. Yet unlike banks, and in contrast to theories predicting full reintermediation, the platforms provide detailed loan information, and some active loan pickers coexist with passive investors. We argue that while intermediation attracts unsophisticated passive investors, transparency in the presence of active investors resolves the lending platform’s moral hazard problem inherent in intermediated markets.

Date: 2024
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