Choosing Investment Managers

Amit Goyal, Sunil Wahal and M. D. Yavuz

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2024, vol. 59, issue 8, 3531-3563

Abstract: Investment managers connected to plans sponsors are more likely to be hired than not-connected managers. The magnitude of the selection effect is comparable to that of prior performance. Ex post, connections do not result in higher post-hiring returns. Relationships are thus conducive to asset gathering by investment managers but do not generate commensurate pecuniary benefits for plan sponsors.

Date: 2024
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