Exposing the Revolving Door in Executive Branch Agencies

Logan P. Emery and Mara Faccio

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2025, vol. 60, issue 4, 1625-1655

Abstract: We develop an extensive mapping of the revolving door phenomenon by examining the work experience of 420,153 individuals in top corporate positions at 12,869 firms. More than half of these firms have at least one such individual with prior experience in one of 187 executive branch agencies. We find that firms are more likely to receive procurement contracts following the appointment of a former regulator transitioning within 2 years of leaving the agency, a result consistent with the “knowledge” hypothesis. Less-complex contracts signed following the appointment of former regulators are more likely to be renegotiated, increasing costs for the government.

Date: 2025
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