KEYNES, RAMSEY, AND PRAGMATISM

Bill Gerrard

Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2023, vol. 45, issue 3, 384-398

Abstract: In his recent paper in this journal, Bradley Bateman (2021) breaks with the “standard view” of Frank Ramsey’s influence on Jahn Maynard Keynes and argues that Ramsey’s pragmatist philosophical thought underpinned both Keynes’s acceptance of Ramsey’s subjective theory of probability and Keynes’s adoption of a narrative theory of the role of confidence in economic fluctuations in the General Theory. In this paper it is argued that Bateman is right both in emphasizing the influence of Ramsey’s pragmatist philosophy on Keynes’s thought during the development of the General Theory and afterwards and in arguing that the influence of Ramsey’s pragmatist philosophy partly explains Keynes’s emphasis on the importance of the state of confidence in Chapter 12 of the General Theory. However, it is argued that Ramsey’s pragmatist philosophy had a much greater influence on Keynes than acknowledged by Bateman. Furthermore, contra Bateman, Keynes’s move to a more pragmatist philosophical position does not imply that Keynes accepted Ramsey’s subjective theory of (measurable) probability.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jhisec:v:45:y:2023:i:3:p:384-398_2

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