Gubernatorial use of executive orders: unilateral action and policy adoption

Mitchell Dylan Sellers

Journal of Public Policy, 2017, vol. 37, issue 3, 315-339

Abstract: I examine gubernatorial use of executive orders, and assess how executive action influences statute adoption. I argue that strong governors use executive orders to pursue policy objectives when they perceive legislation as unlikely to pass. Multilevel Event History Analysis of executive orders and the adoption of statutes that protect the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community from 1975 to 2013 reveals that partisan control of government and intrastate factors influence both forms of policy adoption. My findings support the strategic model that argues that executives turn to executive orders when confronting unfavourable legislative conditions, and that governors issue protections more when entering office. Legislatures respond to partisan control of the legislature and social characteristics. Further, states that have pro-LGBT executive orders in place are more likely to adopt similar statutes. My results suggest that stronger governors are more likely to issue executive orders, but it is states with weaker governors that are more likely to adopt legislation.

Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jnlpup:v:37:y:2017:i:03:p:315-339_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Public Policy from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().