The advantage of paradigmatic contestation in shaping and selling public policies
Gerry Alons
Journal of Public Policy, 2020, vol. 40, issue 4, 651-671
Abstract:
While contestation between competing policy paradigms is usually considered to hamper the policy-making process, this article develops an argument explaining how paradigmatic contestation can also help policymakers obtain their preferred policies. Based on a typology of three paradigm situations – paradigm dominance, paradigmatic contestation and paradigm mixes – this article introduces three different types of strategies (paradigm stretching, banking on inconsistencies and commensurability framing) and explains why more strategies become available when a policy field moves from a situation of paradigmatic dominance to one of contestation and paradigm mixes. An analysis of the introduction and development of direct income payments in the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy, subsequently illustrates how a shift in paradigm situation affected the European Commission’s discursive strategies and shaped the development of direct payments through consecutive reforms. Reflecting on sectoral and institutional variations, the article also discusses the applicability of these findings to other institutional settings and policy fields.
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jnlpup:v:40:y:2020:i:4:p:651-671_7
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