Social Experiments and the Habitual Force of Law

Steven E. Rhoads

Journal of Public Policy, 1987, vol. 7, issue 1, 33-42

Abstract: Advocates of pervasive social experimentation neglect to consider the effect that suchexperimentation might have on citizens' respect for the law and their inclination to obey it. Since habit plays a large part in law abidingness, frequent alterations in law, even when substantively justified on narrow policy grounds, weaken the power of law in general. Because of their great utility, we should use social experiments occasionally when they can shed light on crucial dimensions of truly important policy questions. But because pervasive experimentation threatens law abidingness and citizen support for the regime, we should decide against some otherwise justifiable experiments and neither expect nor wish for the sort of experimenting society advocated by many social scientists.

Date: 1987
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