Setting and Firing Policy Triggers*

Kent Weaver

Journal of Public Policy, 1989, vol. 9, issue 3, 307-336

Abstract: ABSTRACTGovernments increasingly use quantitative policy signals as automatic triggers for policy adjustments rather than simply to inform policy debate. This increased use of policy triggers cannot be explained simply by a technocratic desire to reduce workloads and regularize policy adjustments. Political objectives – notably desires to reduce conflict, bind future policymakers, and avoid blame – play an important role both in decisions to use policy triggers and in the selection of specific triggers. Using policy signals as triggers often leads to the politicization of statistics and to harmful rigidification of policy.

Date: 1989
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jnlpup:v:9:y:1989:i:03:p:307-336_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Public Policy from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().