Improbable Implementation: The Pressman–Wildavsky Paradox Revisited

Ernest R. Alexander

Journal of Public Policy, 1989, vol. 9, issue 4, 451-465

Abstract: The Pressman–Wildavsky model of implementation finds a paradox in the success of any federal programs, based on their low probability of approval. Bowen relaxed this model's independence assumption to improve implementation. Here the model is reexamined: a. its sensitivity is tested; b. the empirical base for the probability range is reviewed; and c. its fit with implementation processes in general is checked. The conclusions are (1) the model's ‘proof’ depends on its assumptions and computations, (2) there is no empirical basis for the probability estimates, and (3) the model only fits one special case of implementation processes. Better models can be developed, and successful implementation may require organizational interdependencies.

Date: 1989
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