Incentives to retire later – a solution to the social security crisis?

Friedrich Breyer and Mathias Kifmann ()

Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 2002, vol. 1, issue 2, 111-130

Abstract: As one possible solution to the well-known financing crisis of unfunded social security systems, an increase in the retirement age is a popular option. To induce workers to retire later, it has been proposed to strengthen the link between retirement age and benefit level. The present paper is devoted to analyzing the long-run financial implications of such a reform. We show that with actuarial adjustments the long-run contribution rate is an increasing function of the retirement age chosen by workers. Moreover, the implicit tax paid to the pension system by a participant can increase in the long run if the retirement age rises in response to a ‘steep’ adjustment rule. In this sense, the proposed ‘cure’ may worsen the disease. Finally, we show how the negative effects can be avoided by forming a capital stock from the additional revenues due to later retirement.

Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Incentives to Retire Later: A Solution to the Social Security Crisis? (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jpenef:v:1:y:2002:i:02:p:111-130_00

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