Information, incentives, and goals in election forecasts

Andrew Gelman, Jessica Hullman, Christopher Wlezien and George Elliott Morris

Judgment and Decision Making, 2020, vol. 15, issue 5, 863-880

Abstract: Presidential elections can be forecast using information from political and economic conditions, polls, and a statistical model of changes in public opinion over time. However, these “knowns” about how to make a good presidential election forecast come with many unknowns due to the challenges of evaluating forecast calibration and communication. We highlight how incentives may shape forecasts, and particularly forecast uncertainty, in light of calibration challenges. We illustrate these challenges in creating, communicating, and evaluating election predictions, using the Economist and Fivethirtyeight forecasts of the 2020 election as examples, and offer recommendations for forecasters and scholars.

Date: 2020
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