INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN COMPETITIVE SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM

Mei Dong ()

Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2011, vol. 15, issue S2, 252-268

Abstract: Rocheteau, Rupert, and Wright [Scandinavian Journal of Economics 109 (2007), 837–855] show that the relationship between inflation and unemployment can be positive or negative, depending on the primitives of the model. The key features are indivisible labor, nonseparable preferences, and bargaining. Their results are derived only for a special case of bargaining, take-it-or-leave-it offer by buyers. Instead of bargaining, this paper considers competitive search. I show that the results of Rocheteau et al. can be generalized to an environment where both buyers and sellers have nonseparable preferences. In addition, the relationship between inflation and unemployment is robust to allowing free entry by sellers, which cannot be studied in Rocheteau et al. (2007).

Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Inflation and Unemployment in Competitive Search Equilibrium (2010)
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