THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE: IMPACTS ON PRIVATE INSURANCE, ASSET HOLDINGS, AND WELFARE

Minchung Hsu and Junsang Lee

Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2013, vol. 17, issue 6, 1252-1280

Abstract: This paper aims to investigate impacts of public provision of universal health insurance (UHI) in an environment with household heterogeneity and financial market incompleteness. Various UHI polices with both distortionary and nondistortionary financing methods are compared to address the trade-off between risk reduction and tax distortion, as well as the corresponding welfare implications. We use a dynamic equilibrium model with endogenous insurance choice and labor supply decisions to perform quantitative analysis. The results suggest that the UHI expenditure coverage rate is too high in most OECD countries when the distortion effect is considered. We find a clear crowding-out effect on asset holdings. Implications for private health insurance (PHI) purchases when UHI is introduced depend on the pricing and the design of coverage. We find that the rich are sensitive to the price of PHI, and would prefer a supplemental plan when UHI is introduced.

Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: The provision of public universal health insurance: impacts on private insurance, asset holdings and welfare (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:17:y:2013:i:06:p:1252-1280_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Macroeconomic Dynamics from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().