CREDIBILITY AND INTERTEMPORAL CONSISTENCY

Kiminori Matsuyama

Macroeconomic Dynamics, 1997, vol. 1, issue 3, 658-665

Abstract: The credibility criterion commonly used in the strategic macroeconomic policy literature, subgame perfection or its variants, ignores a critical problem concerning intertemporal consistency of policy announcements. To capture this additional credibility constraint, this note applies two distinct notions of Renegotiation-Proof, originally proposed in the context of two-person repeated games. Macroeconomic policy games, where the benevolent government interacts with atomistic private agents, offers a new testing ground for these criteria to be evaluated. This note discusses the relative strengths and weaknesses of these criteria.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:1:y:1997:i:03:p:658-665_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Macroeconomic Dynamics from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().