EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

OPTIMAL GROWTH, DEBT DYNAMICS, AND WELFARE UNDER GDP-BASED COLLATERALS

Daria Onori

Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2018, vol. 22, issue 8, 1905-1936

Abstract: We analyze the consequences of external debt collaterals on the optimal growth path of a country. We develop a small open economy model of endogenous growth where public spending can be financed by borrowing on imperfect international financial markets, where the country's borrowing capacity is limited. In contrast to the existing literature, which assumes that debt is constrained by the stock of capital, we investigate the consequences of gross domestic product (GDP)-based collaterals. First, we demonstrate that the economy may converge in a finite time, which is determined endogenously, to the regime with binding collaterals. Second, in such regime the steady-state public expenditures-to-GDP ratio is greater than that of the existing literature's models. Finally, we show that the degree of financial openness rises welfare if the collateral constraint is nonbinding and reduces welfare if the constraint binds. The first effect prevails always over the second and total intertemporal welfare increases.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Growth, Debt Dynamics and Welfare under GDP-Based Collaterals (2015) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:22:y:2018:i:08:p:1905-1936_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Macroeconomic Dynamics from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:22:y:2018:i:08:p:1905-1936_00