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MONEY AND LIMITED ENFORCEMENT IN MULTILATERAL EXCHANGE

Nicola Amendola and Leo Ferraris

Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2020, vol. 24, issue 5, 1222-1239

Abstract: We propose a model in which money performs an essential role in the process of exchange, despite the presence of a multilateral clearing house that collects resources from and distributes them to anonymous agents. Money improves the functioning of the clearing house, simultaneously keeping the incentives to contribute and guaranteeing the fine-tuning of allocations.

Date: 2020
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Working Paper: Money and Limited Enforcement in Multilateral Exchange (2013) Downloads
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