MONEY AND LIMITED ENFORCEMENT IN MULTILATERAL EXCHANGE
Nicola Amendola and
Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2020, vol. 24, issue 5, 1222-1239
We propose a model in which money performs an essential role in the process of exchange, despite the presence of a multilateral clearing house that collects resources from and distributes them to anonymous agents. Money improves the functioning of the clearing house, simultaneously keeping the incentives to contribute and guaranteeing the fine-tuning of allocations.
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Working Paper: Money and Limited Enforcement in Multilateral Exchange (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:24:y:2020:i:5:p:1222-1239_8
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