Health risk and the welfare effects of Social Security

Shantanu Bagchi and Juergen Jung

Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2023, vol. 27, issue 7, 1767-1806

Abstract: We quantify the importance of idiosyncratic health risk in a calibrated general equilibrium model of Social Security. We construct an overlapping generations model with rational-expectations households, idiosyncratic labor income and health risk, profit-maximizing firms, incomplete insurance markets, and a government that provides pensions and health insurance. We calibrate this model to the US economy and perform two computational experiments: $\left (i\right)$ cutting Social Security’s payroll tax, and $\left (ii\right)$ modifying Social Security’s benefit-earnings rule. Our findings suggest that health risk amplifies the welfare implications of both experiments: downsizing Social Security always leads to higher overall welfare, but the welfare gain is larger when we account for health risk, and increasing the progressivity of Social Security’s benefit-earnings rule has a larger positive effect on welfare in the presence of health risk. We also find that allowing households additional tools to self-insure against health risk weakens the precautionary motive, so our experiments have similar welfare implications both with and without health risk.

Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:27:y:2023:i:7:p:1767-1806_1

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Macroeconomic Dynamics from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().