It's Not Just a Visit: Receiving Government Officials’ Visits and Firm Performance in China

Weiwen Li, Eric W. K. Tsang, Danglun Luo and Qianwei Ying

Management and Organization Review, 2016, vol. 12, issue 3, 577-604

Abstract: Drawing upon signaling theory, we propose that a specific form of non-market action, receiving government officials’ visits, reduces transaction costs between firms and their potential exchange partners and thus contributes to firms’ competitive advantage in China. We also contend that severity of information asymmetry and availability of alternative ways of reducing transaction costs moderate the relationship between receiving government officials’ visits and company financial performance in opposite directions. The former factor increases the ex ante value of receiving government officials’ visits and strengthens its positive impact on financial performance, while the latter factor decreases the ex post value of receiving government officials’ visits and reduces its positive impact. Our conceptual framework is supported by analyses that draw on a sample of listed manufacturing firms in China. Our study contributes to a more in-depth understanding of non-market actions in emerging economies, their contingencies, and their performance implications.

Date: 2016
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