Diffusion and protection across a random graph

Andrea Galeotti and Brian W. Rogers

Network Science, 2015, vol. 3, issue 3, 361-376

Abstract: We study the interplay between the diffusion of a harmful state in a network of contacts and the possibility of individual agents to undertake costly investment to protect themselves against infection. We characterize how equilibrium diffusion outcomes, such as the immunization rate, total prevalence and welfare, respond to changes in the architecture of the network, and show that these responses depend on the details of the diffusion process.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:netsci:v:3:y:2015:i:03:p:361-376_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Network Science from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().