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Another Great Illusion:1 The Advancement of Separatism through Economic Integration*

Dawn Brancati

Political Science Research and Methods, 2014, vol. 2, issue 1, 69-95

Abstract: Economic integration is widely argued to increase subnational demands for independence. Yet increasingly high degrees of integration have not been associated with a commensurate growth in separatist activity. This article argues that integration is not likely to promote separatism in general because the economic benefits of integration are not uniformly positive, and are not large enough for most regions to provide for their own defense in order to sustain themselves as independent states. This argument is empirically tested using the case of post-WWII European integration, a hard test of the argument, since the European Union is the most advanced economic integration scheme in the world. The quantitative analysis supports the argument, showing that European integration is only weakly associated with a modest increase in electoral support for separatist parties. Further qualitative analysis suggests that the effect of integration is conditional on other factors as well.

Date: 2014
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