Preventive War as a Result of Long-Term Shifts in Power*

Colin Krainin

Political Science Research and Methods, 2017, vol. 5, issue 1, 103-121

Abstract: This paper analyzes a complete information model of preventive war where shifts in the distribution of power play out over an arbitrary number of time periods. This analysis leads to a sufficient condition that implies war under a broader set of conditions than previously shown in the literature. This sufficient condition leads to two substantive implications: (1) preventive war can be caused by relatively slow, but persistent shifts in the distribution of power; and (2) a power shift that causes war may do so only after some delay. These insights serve to connect the long-term shifts emphasized in Power Transition Theory with the commitment problem explanation for preventive war analyzed in bargaining models of war.

Date: 2017
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