Constructing Congressional Activity: Uncertainty and the Dynamics of Legislative Attention*

Josh M. Ryan

Political Science Research and Methods, 2018, vol. 6, issue 2, 299-321

Abstract: Members and parties have electoral incentives to address issues on the congressional agenda to satisfy public demand. When determining which issues to address, majorities seek to minimize their uncertainty about the costs and electoral benefits of legislating by revisiting policy areas previously addressed. This theory is tested using error-correction models that demonstrate that policy activity within each chamber is in a long-term equilibrium and that the passage of legislation, even important bills, promotes future policymaking in the same policy area. This relationship is stronger when the majority has less information about the costs of lawmaking—specifically, when it faces a chamber controlled by the opposite party and when it is a new majority.

Date: 2018
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