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How valuable is a legislative seat? Incumbency effects in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies

Juan Pablo Micozzi and Adrián Lucardi

Political Science Research and Methods, 2021, vol. 9, issue 2, 414-429

Abstract: In many developing countries, national legislative seats are considered less valuable than (subnational) executive positions. Even then, ambitious politicians may seek a legislative seat either (a) as a window of opportunity for jumping to an executive office; or (b) as a consolation prize when no better option is available. Using a regression discontinuity design adapted to a pr setting, we examine these possibilities in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 2011. In line with the consolation prize story, we find that marginal candidates from the Peronist party—which controls most provincial governorships—are more likely to be renominated and serve an additional term in the legislature, but not necessarily to jump to an executive office. The effect is stronger in small provinces.

Date: 2021
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