Oligopolio y tipos de interés en la Banca española, 1942–1975*

M. Ángeles Pons Brias

Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 2001, vol. 19, issue 3, 679-703

Abstract: This paper discusses the price collusive behaviour of the main Spanish banks from the end of the Civil War to 1975. The second purpose of this paper is to obtain quantitative and qualitative indicators of the degree of effectiveness of these cartel agreements. I conclude that in spite of the existence of collusive pacts to fix price conditions, the main banks broke cartel agreements and they competed in prices in the deposit market side, and especially from the mid-1950s onward.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:reveco:v:19:y:2001:i:03:p:679-703_00

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