Prepaid tickets to the New World: the New York Continental Conference and transatlantic steerage Fares 1885–1895*

Torsten Feys

Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 2008, vol. 26, issue 2, 173-204

Abstract: This article surveys the situation of the shipping cartels (conferences) which regulated transatlantic migrant transport from the European Continent to the United States. The focus of the article is to identify the internal and external pressures underlying these agreements and the strategies employed to neutralize these pressures. The author reaches the conclusion that a pool agreement was essential for the effectiveness of the Conference, which was both a means of horizontal integration regulating the competition between shipping companies and a means of vertical integration to gain control over the transatlantic migrant agent network selling the ocean passage tickets. The author also correlates the efficiency of the agreements with steerage fares and migration costs.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:reveco:v:26:y:2008:i:02:p:173-204_00

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