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Talent, Slavery and Envy in Dworkin's Equality of Resources

Miriam Cohen Christofidis

Utilitas, 2004, vol. 16, issue 3, 267-287

Abstract: In this article I argue against Ronald Dworkin's rejection of the labour auction in his ‘Equality of Resources’. I criticize Dworkin's claims that the talented would envy the untalented in such an auction, and that the talented in particular would be enslaved by it. I identify some ways in which the talent auction is underdescribed and I compare the results for the condition of the talented of different further descriptions of it. I conclude that Dworkin's deviation from the ‘envy test’ criterion results in an inequality between the talented and the untalented which cannot be justified in egalitarian terms.

Date: 2004
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