Insane Consequentialism: A Pragmatic Objection to Direct Consequentialism

Nick Zangwill

Utilitas, 2018, vol. 30, issue 3, 317-332

Abstract: I argue that direct consequentialism is not rationally believable. I focus on duties of love. Those feelings are so fundamental to us that believing consequentialism creates insanity. For it entails negative judgements not just about our loyal acts, but also about our deepest feelings. If direct consequentialism is true we should be able to believe it and stay sane. But we cannot, so it is not true.

Date: 2018
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