Altruism and Desert

Sean Clancy

Utilitas, 2019, vol. 31, issue 3, 310-325

Abstract: Suppose that virtue is intrinsically morally good, and that we have a pro tanto moral reason to act in ways which promote it. Further suppose that the failure of agents to receive what they deserve is intrinsically morally bad, and that we have a pro tanto moral reason not to act in ways which frustrate desert. When we are deciding whether to encourage others to make altruistic sacrifices, these two pro tanto moral reasons come into conflict. To encourage such sacrifices promotes virtue; it also causes virtuous agents to be worse off, preventing them from receiving their deserts. I argue that these effects on desert can reduce the moral desirability of promoting altruism so significantly as to make it morally wrong. This has implications for public policy, since certain practical questions turn on the extent to which we ought to rely on altruism as a means of solving social problems.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:utilit:v:31:y:2019:i:03:p:310-325_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Utilitas from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().