ANALIZĂ CRITICĂ A CONSIDERENTELOR DECIZIEI CURŢII CONSTITUŢIONALE NR. 799/2011 PRIVIND PROIECTUL LEGII DE REVIZUIRE A CONSTITUŢIEI

Alexandra Pleşea­creţan

FIAT IUSTITIA, 2014, vol. 8, issue 1, 175-189

Abstract: The criticism on establishing a unicameral parliament that the Constitutional Court has accepted is based on the historical tradition of a bicameral parliament, on the operation of the principle of balance of powers in a constitutional state which is stipulated in art. 1 paragraph 4 of the Constitution and on the functioning of the bicameralism in the comparative law. The addition brought by art. 85 which states: "The proposal of the Prime Minister on the revocation and appointment of members of the Government can be done only after prior consultation with the President" is unconstitutional as the Prime Minister reports only to the Parliament that gave him its vote of confidence. If he reported to the President, it would be necessary to consult him first. The Court in its jurisprudence affirms the need to respect the principle of separation and balance of powers, by declaring the constitutionality of the amendment, reverses this balance, giving the President strong powers and does not take note of the art. 80 paragraph 2 on the President’s function of mediation between the state powers as well as between the state and society. The amendment of art. 95 which reads: "For having committed serious acts infringing the Constitution, the President of Romania may be suspended from office by the Parliament, by a majority vote of its members, after obtaining the mandatory approval of the Constitutional Court on the seriousness of the offenses and the violation of the Constitution" is unconstitutional because: ­ it prejudices the principle of separation and balance of powers between the Parliament and the President if the Parliament is restricted in its right of suspension by the opinion of the Court; ­ instead of ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution, the Court stands above the Parliament through its opinion, although even after the proposed revision The Parliament still remains the supreme representative body of the Romanian people and the sole legislative authority of the country (article 61 paragraph 1); ­ it is inadmissible that an authority appointed by the Parliament and the President, which has indirect representativeness, may be able to censor the political activity of the Parliament and thus has the political responsibility of the President blocked.

Keywords: constitutional framework; fiscal surveillance; fiscal governance; economic crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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