Gouvernance familiale et politique de distribution aux actionnaires

Patrice Charlier and Céline Duboys ()
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Céline Duboys: CERGAM, IMPGT, Université Paul Cézanne - Aix Marseille III

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2011, vol. 14, issue 1, 5-31.

Abstract: (VF)L’objectif de cette étude est d’analyser la relation entre les politiques de distribution des entreprises familiales cotées et deux grands types de conflits d’agence dans les entreprises familiales, entre actionnaires et dirigeant (type I), et entre actionnaires majoritaires et minoritaires (type II). Les résultats sur les entreprises du SBF 250 montrent que les montants distribués sont liés à ces deux composantes du conflit d’agence, qui est globalement moins fort dans les entreprises familiales.(VA)This paper studies payout policies of listed family firms. The recent evolution of family firm models allows for a study of two types of agency conflicts, the one between shareholders and the manager (type I), and the one between majority and minority shareholders (type II). Our results show that payout policies are related to the intensity of the two types of agency conflicts which are overall weaker than in non family firms.

Keywords: dividende; gouvernance familiale; conflits d’agence type I et II; théorie du signal; biais comportementaux; dividend; family governance; agency problems I and II; signaling theory; behavioral bias. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G32 G35 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:14:y:2011:i:q1:p:5-31.

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