La gouvernance des entreprises au Japon: les causes de son dysfonctionnement

Masaru Yoshimori ()
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Masaru Yoshimori: Yokohama National University

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 1998, vol. 1, issue 4, 173-199

Abstract: The current economic crisis of Japan may be attributed largely to the dysfunction of the corporate goverance system. The post-war break-up of Zaibatsu family trusts resulted in management control. The President has shielded himself from the discipline of the capital market through cross-shareholdings, cross-directorships and long-term business relations, in particular with the main bank. Internal and external mechanisms of control became inefficient. Up until the 80s the large discretionary power of the President assured shareholders a higher return on investment by international comparison. This management control backfired early 90s.

Keywords: corporate governance; management control; cross shareholdings; main bank; hostile takeovers; meeting of shareholders; board of directors; CEO; statutory auditors; CPA; US pension funds; shareholder value; regulatory agencies; collusion. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:1:y:1998:i:q4:p:173-199

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