La politique de stock-options des entreprises familiales cotées:quelques résultats empiriques

Gérard Hirigoyen and Thierry Poulain-Rehm
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Thierry Poulain-Rehm: Université de Bordeaux 4

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2000, vol. 3, issue 1, 139-167

Abstract: This study investigates whether quoted family firms present particularities in stock options policy, in France. This research, which suggests a definition of family firms, is based on the analysis of the Bulletin des Annonces Légales Obligatoires and on a survey of 61 firms (24 family-controlled and 37 non-family-controlled firms). The results are am-biguous:while many family firms grant employee stock options, their policies are generally selective. Moreover, even if family-controlled firms look for participative management with stock options, the effects in terms of incentive implications and development of loyalty are contradictory. The results show that family and non-family-controlled firms have the same conduct as regard to stock options.

Keywords: stock options; family firms; participation; incentives; development of loyalty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:3:y:2000:i:q1:p:139-167

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