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Efficacité des structures de contrôle et enracinement des dirigeants

Hervé Alexandre () and Mathieu Paquerot ()
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Mathieu Paquerot: Université de Franche-Comté

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2000, vol. 3, issue 2, 5-29

Abstract: In the theoretical framework of corporate governance this article studies the efficiency of the control exerted by the ownership structure and the board of directors on managers. The confrontation of en-trenchment theory and agency theory allows to determine the necessary conditions of the controller's efficiency. The ownership structure and the board of directors rarely unite all these conditions. Tests realized with the bootstrap method corroborate the entrenchment theory hypotheses and reject partially the arguments of agency theory.

Keywords: corporate governance; agency theory; entrenchment theory; ownership structure; board of directors. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:3:y:2000:i:q2:p:5-29