Faut-il adopter un système pro-créanciers de défaillances? Une revue de la littérature

Gilles Recasens ()
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Gilles Recasens: Université Bordeaux 1

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2003, vol. 6, issue 1, 119-153

Abstract: Bankruptcy choices condition, i) the efficiency of liquidation or reorganization decisions, ii) the incen-tives delivered to the debtor-in-place and its creditors. On the one hand, there is no incompatibility between a pro-creditors system and the possibility to reach informal agreements and a high proportion of firms emerging from bankruptcy as going concerns. On the other hand, credit rationing is less severe in such systems. Finally, offering a higher protection for creditors interests, pro-creditors systems let them the possibility to be more lenient. This effect favors the formal reorganization of distressed firms.

Keywords: financial distress; bankruptcy law; incentives; filtering failures; bankruptcy costs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G33 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:6:y:2003:i:q1:p:119-153

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