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Systèmes de gouvernance, actionnaires dominants et performance future des entreprises

Paul Andre () and Eduardo Schiehll
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Eduardo Schiehll: HEC Montréal

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2004, vol. 7, issue 2, 165-193

Abstract: (VF)La structure de propriété au Canada est fortement concentrée. Les résultats univariés de cette étude révèlent une relation positive entre la performance et d’une part, la proportion d’administrateurs indépendants, d’autre part, l’importance de la rémunération incitative du PDG. Ceux de l’analyse multivariée indiquent une relation négative entre la performance et le niveau de propriété du dirigeant et de l’actionnaire dominant, s’il est simultanément dirigeant. (VA)Contrary to the US, ownership in Canada is concentrated in the hands of large shareholders which often are also managers of the firm. Univariate results show a positive relationship between performance and both outsiders on the board and the level of CEO incentive compensation. Multivariate results show a negative relationship between performance and both CEO and large shareholder ownership only in the case where large shareholders are also managers.

Keywords: gouvernance; performance de la firme; actionnaire dominant; dirigeants; rémunération; conseil d’administration; corporate governance; firm performance; large shareholders; executive compensation; board characteristics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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