Paying by the Hour: The Least Appealing Option for Clients of Lawyers

Jo Seldeslachts

DIW Economic Bulletin, 2016, vol. 6, issue 26/27, 295-299

Abstract: In this study, we analyze a client’s choice of contract in auctions where Dutch law firms compete for cases. The distinguishing feature is that lawyers may submit bids with any fee arrangement they wish. We find robust evidence that bids offering hourly rates are less attractive to clients. Our findings tentatively contradict lawyers’ often-made argument that hourly rates are in a client’s best interest.

Keywords: Lawyers’ fee arrangements; clients’ choices; discrete choice models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C25 D43 K10 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwdeb:2016-26-1

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