EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Coalitions for Sanctions Heighten Costs for Russia but Burden of Implementation Should Be Shared among Member Countries

Sonali Chowdhry, Julian Hinz, Joschka Wanner and Katrin Kamin

DIW Weekly Report, 2024, vol. 14, issue 8, 65-72

Abstract: Countries increasingly form alliances to collectively impose sanctions. However, the resulting impact of such coordination remains unclear. Analyzing the 2014 wave of sanctions against Russia over 400,000 simulations with a quantitative trade model, this report demonstrates that multilateral cooperation through coalitions simultaneously reduced domestic welfare losses incurred from sanctions and intensified welfare losses imposed on Russia. Results also reveal significant disparities within the coalition, with Russia sanctions placing relatively high economic costs on Baltic nations that can be mitigated through a burden-sharing program. Hypothetical cooperation by emerging economies like China is also shown to substantially raise the force of sanctions against Russia

Keywords: Sanctions; Alliances; Global value chains (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F14 F17 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.894040.de/dwr-24-08-1.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwdwr:dwr14-8-1

Access Statistics for this article

DIW Weekly Report is currently edited by Tomaso Duso, Marcel Fratzscher, Peter Haan, Claudia Kemfert, Alexander Kritikos, Alexander Kriwoluzky, Stefan Liebig, Lukas Menkhoff, Karsten Neuhoff, Carsten Schröder, Katharina Wrohlich and Sabine Fiedler

More articles in DIW Weekly Report from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bibliothek ().

 
Page updated 2025-01-08
Handle: RePEc:diw:diwdwr:dwr14-8-1