 Rationing by Waiting, Opportunity Costs of Waiting and BriberyIndian Economic Review, 2003, vol. 38, issue 1, 59-75 Abstract: This paper analyzes the relationship between opportunity costs of waiting and bribery in rationing by waiting situations. Assuming that a uniform waiting time clears the market for any given bribe and the bureaucrat chooses a bribe to maximize profit, the market equilibrium is characterized in terms of individual valuations of the good and opportunity costs of waiting. If individual valuations take discrete values and opportunity costs of waiting are uniformly distributed then in an equilibrium individuals with low costs of waiting choose to wait while those with high opportunity costs pay the bribe. However if valuations and costs of waiting are uniformly distributed, bribery is pervasive in equilibrium (i.e. all units are sold via bribery). Moreover, an increase in bribery does not necessarily imply an improvement in allocational efficiency. Keywords: Allocational Efficiency; Bribery; Exclusion; Rationing by waiting; Uniform Distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dse:indecr:v:38:y:2003:i:1:p:59-75 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Indian Economic Review is currently edited by Pami Dua (Editor) & Ram Singh (Associate Editor) and Sunil Kanwar More articles in Indian Economic Review from Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics University of Delhi, Delhi 110 007. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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