The International Law and Economics of Coercive Diplomacy: Macroeconomic Effects and Empirical Findings

Christopher Warburton

Applied Econometrics and International Development, 2016, vol. 16, issue 1, 35-52

Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the actual and probable macroeconomic effects of economic sanctions (coercive diplomacy) within the framework of international law. It considers the performance of critical macroeconomic variables before and after the imposition of sanctions. The methodology of this paper incorporates risk tolerance (probabilities) in order to report probabilistic and real outcomes when targets become noncompliant. For a select number of countries with a history of exposure to sanctions, this paper finds that states that are willing to accommodate the economic risks imposed by senders are not likely to increase national income and human welfare.

JEL-codes: F13 F17 F51 F53 K33 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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