Rational inattention and information provision experiments

Bartosz Maćkowiak

Research Bulletin, 2025, vol. 134

Abstract: In surveys with information provision experiments, researchers can observe how people change beliefs, and sometimes also actions, after having been confronted with information. This article interprets information provision experiments from the perspective of the theory of rational inattention, discussing what survey findings tell us about economic behaviour outside the survey and deriving implications for central bank communication. One implication is that there may be a weak response from individuals to certain kinds of real‑world policy communication even though they respond strongly during an information provision experiment. JEL Classification: D8, D9, E7

Keywords: information provision experiment; randomised control trial; rational inattention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09
Note: 1026376
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