The Pit and the Pendulum: Arbitration in the British Coal Industry, 1893-1914

John G Treble

Economic Journal, 1990, vol. 100, issue 403, 1095-1108

Abstract: In this paper, the author constructs a game form based on the constitutions of the British coal industry conciliation boards, and shows how the induced game can be used to explain certain features of the record of the wage negotiations for which the conciliation boards were responsible. In particular, he tests various alternative explanations of the observed frequency of appeal to the arbitrator. The results are generally favorable to the view that the negotiators behaved rationally within the constraints imposed by the boards' constitutions. Copyright 1990 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1990
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