European Monetary Union: Institutional Structure and Economic Performance

David Currie

Economic Journal, 1992, vol. 102, issue 411, 248-64

Abstract: This paper examines what economics can say about a regime shift from the exchange rate mechanism to European monetary union. The primary issues concern the credibility of monetary and fiscal policy; the institutional structures that best underpin that credibility; and how agents will learn to adopt to these new structures. The consequences of European monetary union are shown to depend on the decision-making structure and degree of independence of a European central bank, and the precise institutional setup. Finally, it is argued that a successful European monetary union will require a set of rules limiting governments' fiscal actions. Copyright 1992 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1992
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