Comparison Shopping as a Simultaneous Move Game

Louis L Wilde

Economic Journal, 1992, vol. 102, issue 412, 562-69

Abstract: This paper analyzes simultaneous move models of comparison shopping. It shows that the equilibria in Wilde-Schwartz (1979) can be rationalized as symmetric mixed strategies in an appropriately defined game in which information-acquisition costs are endogenous. It also shown that, in the simultaneous move version of Salop-Stiglitz (1977), nonexistence of equilibrium is not a problem. In fact, a variety of forms of equilibria emerge in that model: pure strategy, mixed strategy, and blends of the two. Copyright 1992 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1992
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