Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence
James Andreoni () and
John H Miller
Economic Journal, 1993, vol. 103, issue 418, 570-85
This paper presents experiments designed to examine the sequential equilibrium reputation hypothesis in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. The authors test the hypothesis by controlling the subjects' ability to build reputations and by manipulating their beliefs that their opponent is irrational or altruistic. The responses of subjects strongly support the sequential equilibrium prediction. The results also suggest an important role for 'homemade altruism,' that is, a natural tendency to cooperate that subjects bring to the experiment from the outside. The authors find that there may be no difference between the beliefs that an opponent is altruistic and the actual chance it is so. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (196) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%2819930 ... 0.CO%3B2-O&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
Working Paper: Rational Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma: experimental evidence (1997)
Working Paper: Rational Cooperative in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence (1991)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:103:y:1993:i:418:p:570-85
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0013-0133
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen
More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing ().