The Theory of the Labour-Managed Firm Revisited: The Voluntary Interactive Approach

Nava Kahana and Shmuel Nitzan

Economic Journal, 1993, vol. 103, issue 419, 937-45

Abstract: Membership in the authors' labor-managed firm is determined in the long run by expected income maximization. In the short run, upon the realization of output price, each member may leave the labor-managed firm. However, a decision to leave when the entire membership quits is associated with fixed cost. This arrangement ensures ex post egalitarianism and sense of job security. The authors' short-run result is that employment does not exhibit a perverse response to price variations. The long-run result is that their labor-managed firm is more populous than the Illyrian firm and may even be more than its capitalistic twin. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1993
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