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The Design of Auctions and Tenders with Quality Thresholds: The Symmetric Case

Martin Cripps and Norman Ireland

Economic Journal, 1994, vol. 104, issue 423, 316-26

Abstract: Three designs of auctions with quality thresholds are considered. The quality threshold is not known with certainty by the bidders. In one scheme, quality plans submitted by potential bidders are evaluated first and price bids for only those plans that have been approved are invited. The second scheme has price bids first to yield a priority for scrutinizing quality. A third has simultaneous decisions on price and quality. The model yields an equivalence result. The use of reserve prices to produce social optimality is then investigated. The theory is used to discuss the recent auction for U.K. television franchises. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1994
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