Reading Cournot, Reading Nash: The Creation and Stabilisation of the Nash Equilibrium

Robert J Leonard

Economic Journal, 1994, vol. 104, issue 424, 492-511

Abstract: The concept of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is central to noncooperative game theory and the latter's use in macroeconomic theory. This paper considers the creation of this theoretical construct, examining the separate contributions of both Cournot and Nash, and showing how the two were ultimately joined together in the eyes of contemporary economic theorists. Rather than simply showing how Cournot served as a precursor to Nash, the author challenges the traditional approach and emphasizes the shifts in interpretation of their respective contributions. In so doing, he addresses some pertinent questions about the manner in which economic theorists view the evolution of their own discipline. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1994
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